The Mughals in the Brahmaputra valley 1602 - 1682

Mughal interest in the Brahmaputra valley began in 1602 when the Nawab of Dhaka attacked Parikshit Narayan of Koch Hajo at Dhubri, the western most corner of Assam. The first Mughal-Ahom conflict took place in 1615 when the Mughals attacked the Ahoms, then under Pratap Singha, for protecting Bali Narayan, the brother of Parikshit. This resulted in a period of Mughal-Ahom war with fluctuating fortunes that ended with the Treaty of Asurar Ali in 1639. The Treaty fixed Barnadi river in the north bank and Asurar Ali in the south bank of the Brahmaputra as the boundary between the Ahoms and the Mughals. This, and the defeat of the Koch king at Pandu in 1641, resulted in a period of Mughal administration in Kamrup (Guwahati and Hajo.)

Taking advantage of the Mughal succession wars after the fall of the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan in 1658, Pran Narayan of Koch Bihar tried to occupy Koch Hajo, but the Ahoms under Jayadhwaj Singha took Guwahati and pushed him back beyond Dhubri. That the Ahoms reached Dhubri by defeating the Koch king and not the Mughals would form a central tenet in later Ahom diplomacy. Soon after, Aurangzeb occupied the Delhi throne. Mir Jumla, pursuing Shah Shuja in Bengal, was appointed the Subahdar of Bengal in 1660 and asked to retake Assam. Mir Jumla marched in 1661 and defeated the Ahoms at successive encounters to finally take the Ahom capital Garhgaon. But the daga juddha (guerrilla warfare) of Atan Burhagohain and the rains succeeded in cutting off Mughal communication lines making it impossible for Mir Jumla to consolidate Mughal rule. Unaware of Mir Jumlas difficulties and unnerved by Baduli Phukan's defection, Jayadhwaj Singha sued for peace (Sarkar 1992:187), an opportunity Mir Jumla seized on. The Treaty of Ghilajharighat (1663) brought an end to Mughal occupation of Garhgaon, but the conditions of this treaty were so severe that the Ahoms were soon resolved to reverse them.

Ahom preparations to renew the war

After the humiliating defeat inflicted by Mir Jumla the Ahom king Jayadhwaj Singha died in despair. On his deathbed, he exhorted his cousin and successor Chakradhwaj Singha to "remove the spear of humiliation from the bosom of the nation." There followed a complete overhaul of the Ahom kingdom. People who had dispersed due to Mir Jumla's invasion were rehabilitated in the appropriate khels, food and military productions were increased, new forts were constructed and garrisoned and an expeditionary army was organized under a new commander—Lachit Borphukan (Sarkar 1992:199).[1] Alliances were renewed with the Jaintia and the Kachari kingdoms. During this period Mughal imperial demands were tactfully and diplomatically rebuffed, but when the new Faujdar of Guwahati, Firuz Khan, forced the matter in March 1667, the Ahoms were compelled to move (Sarkar 1992:204). In August 1667 the Ahom army, under Lachit Borphukan and accompanied by Atan Burhagohain, sailed downstream to retake Guwahati.

The Ahoms retake Guwahati 1667

Lachit made Kaliabor, the old seat of the Borphukan, his base camp and advanced toward Guwahati along both banks of the Brahmaputra. On the north bank the Deka Phukan retook Bahbari in early September 1667. On the south bank, the Nausalia Phukan and others, moving on land and water, captured Kajali, Sonapur, Panikhaiti, and Titamara forts between the Kapili river and Guwahati. The Ahoms then reached Guwahati which was defended by five choukies on each bank of the Brahmaputra (north--Kanai-borosi-bowa, Hillar, Hindurighopa, Patduar and Korai; south--Latasil, Joiduar, Dharamduar, Duarguria and Pandu). With some loss, the Ahoms captured Shah Buruz and Rangamahal forts, a little north of the city. An extended battle was fought for the Itakhuli fort (at the site of the current Deputy Commissioner's bungalow). The Ahoms besieged Joiduar, occupied Pandu, and in spite of a Mughal reinforcement, approached Itakhuli. The grand attack was launched on the night of November 4, 1667, when the Ahoms scaled the walls by ladders and after two months of siege, Itakhuli fell in mid-November 1667. Most of the defenders were massacred, many surrendered but a few managed to escape. War provisions, treasures and war material fell into Ahom hands (Sarkar 1992:206–207).

The Mughals received some reinforcement at this point and retaliated against the Ahoms. The Ahoms fought back with their naval forces and removed them from their bases in Umananda and Barhat. The Mughals, pursued by the Ahoms, managed to fortify the Manahmukh (the confluence of Manas river) and fend off the attackers for some time but Firuz Khan finally surrendered and was taken prisoner. This brought an end to the recapture of Guwahati and the Ahoms were able to control their old Manas border once again. But this did not last long and they had to beat a strategic retreat due to the advancing Mughal army of Raja Ram Singh.

Mughal imperial invasion 1667

Mughal emperor Aurangzeb was informed of the losses on December 19, 1667 and he commissioned Raja Ram Singh of Amber, son of the famous Mirza Raja Jai Singh, to take back Guwahati. Ram Singh left Delhi on December 27, 1667, and finally reached Rangamati in February in 1669. He was accompanied, as was the Mughal custom of sending two generals, by Rashid Khan, ex-faujdar of Guwahati, and from Patna by the Sikh Guru Tegh Bahadur. The Ahoms, anticipating a Mughal strike, is said to have followed his movements from Delhi itself. Along the way Aurangzeb augmented Ram Singh's forces of 4,000 troopers (from his char-hazaari mansab), 1,500 ahadis and 500 barqandezes by an additional 30,000 infantrymen, 21 Rajput chiefs (Thakurs) with their contingents, 18,000 cavalry, 2,000 archers and shieldmen and 40 ships (Sarkar 1992:211) When Lachit surveyed the massive Mughal force later, he was moved to tears and he uttered: "It is a tragedy that my country is facing this dire catastrophe during my Phukanship. How will my king be saved? How will my people be saved? And how will my posterity be saved?" (Sarkar 1992:229)

Armies from Koch Bihar joined the Mughal forces since they were vassals.

Ahom strategic planning and Mughal attacks 1669

Aware of Mughal military might and the weakness of the Ahom soldiers, especially against cavalry and mounted forces in open fields, Lachit Borphukan and others decided to choose the terrain of the battlefield with care. The choice fell on Guwahati, which was hilly, on the way to the heart of the Ahom kingdom and without open fields where the Mughal forces would not have sufficient mobility. The only way east was via the Brahmaputra river passing through it. The Brahmaputra at Saraighat, at its narrowest 1km width, was ideal for a naval defense. To check the Mughal advance, Lachit prepared a complex system of mud embankments in Guwahati. When the Mughals found Guwahati impregnable by land, they would be forced to use their navy, which was their weakest asset. Lachit set up his headquarters at Andharubali, the sandbanks between the Kamakhya and Sukreshwar hills. The deliberations of the war council were recorded and made into a manual (Sarkar 1992:213).

When the Mughal march reached the Manas river in March-April 1669 and defeated some Ahom forces, Lachit decided on a strategic retreat to Guwahati. Three Rajkhowas were asked to meet the Mughal forces and retreat to Guwahati, keeping the Mughal forces in sight but beyond the reach of their weapons. When the Mughals reached closer, he started a sham negotiation with Ram Singh, who had set up camp at Agiathuti, calling him a "Bhai Raja" (brother prince). And when he was ready for the Mughal attacks, he sent words to Ram Singh via Firuz Khan that "Guwahati and Kamrup do not belong to the Mughals" since they were taken from the Koch and that the Assamese were prepared to fight to the last (Sarkar 1992:214).

A period of battles between the Ahom and Mughal forces in the region of Guwahati followed, with varied results with forts changing hands many times. In these battles, the Mughal forces were arraigned in four divisions (Sarkar 1992:215):

The north bank, commanded by Ram Singh himself.

The south bank, under Ali Akbar Khan, Mir Sayyid Khan, Raja Indramani, Raja Jaynarayan and Marul Khan

The Sindurighopa entrance, under Jahir Beg, Kayam Khan, Ghanashyam Bakshi, and three Baruah's from Koch Bihar—Kavisekhar, Sarveshwar and Manmatha.

The river, guarded by the naval commanders Mansur Khan, Latif Khan, Iswarpati, firinghees (Europeans) and one Kapidan Raja.

In these attacks the Ahom allies—the Garos, the Jaintia, the Nagas, the Rani of Darrang, the Raja of Rani, and even the monsoons of 1669—joined battle. The Ahom defense was arraigned as follows (according to Gogoi 1968:39–43):

The north bank, under the command of Atan Burhagohain.

The south bank, under the command of Lachit Borphukan.

Both commanders had a number of pali commanders each defending a specific strategic area, with each pali reorganized in response to the challenge posed by Ram Singh's forces.

Aurangzeb received information of the lack of progress in August 1669 and made arrangements with the Subahdar of Bengal, Shaistha Khan, to provide reinforcements to Ram Singh. This period is also known for Atan Burhagohain's dagga judha (guerilla warfare). Ram Singh protested that these harassing campaigns lowered the "dignity of warfare", and withdrew from fighting (October 1669-March 1670), to no particular military advantage (Sarkar 1992:218–219).

Major Ahom reversal at Alaboi 1669

One of these battles stood out for a major Ahom reversal. Exasperated with the delaying tactics of the Borphukan, Ram Singh asked for a duel with the Ahom king. He promised to withdraw from Assam with his army if he was defeated. Lachit updated Chakradhwaj Singha about this proposal, who rejected the offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to duel a mere servant "who has no umbrella over his head." Annoyed with Ram Singh's proposal he ordered Lachit to confront the Mughals militarily. In a battle that was set up as a challenge, a force of 10,000 Mughals under Mir Nawab was to confront a force of 20,000 Ahom cavalry. Ram Singh's "approach was psychological, marked by pride, chivalry and revenge". The Ahom approach, to cover their basic weaknesses, was based on "diplomacy, deception and mispresentation". So instead of 20,000, they sent in 40,000 and using an anti-koch tactic that had worked against Chilarai, they dressed their vanguard archers and musketeers as Brahmans to make the Rajput warriors desist from killing them. Ram Singh, on the other hand, set a woman, Madanavati, dressed as a man, to command the vanguard to deny the Ahoms any glory in case of a victory. The battle took place in the fields adjoining the Alaboi hills about August 5, 1669.

In the first phase, Madanavati dispersed the first four lines of the Ahom vanguard with ease, but the Borphukan had trenches dug to conceal his other lines. In the second phase, a diversion to cross the Brahmaputra was thwarted, and Madanavati was shot. The battle turned and in the third phase, Mir Nawab's forces were routed. Enraged at the deception, Ram Singh let loose his veteran horsemen and in the carnage that followed, 10,000 Ahom soldiers were massacred.

Aurangzeb was pleased with these Mughal successes and increased Ram Singh's mansab from 4000 to 5000. Ram Singh was also instructed to invest Guwahati soon, and if it was not possible, to devastate the land and plunder the people.

Final diplomatic maneuvers

After the Mughal advances in late 1669, Ram Singh began diplomatic efforts. The proposal was for the Assamese to evacuate Guwahati and a return to the 1639 status quo (Treaty of Asurar Ali) in return for a Mughal payment of 300,000 rupees. The Ahoms did not respond favorably. Ram Singh next attempted to bribe and create divisions among the Ahom field commanders (Phukans). In the mean time, the Ahom king Chakradhwaj Singha died and was succeeded by his brother Udayaditya Singha. The long war had resulted in popular discontent in the Ahom kingdom. Ram Singh again put forward his proposal on the 1639 status quo settlement and this time the Ahoms appeared receptive. The Ahom king, though displeased, left the decision to his commanders in Guwahati. In the meeting which included Lachit Borphukan, the only dissenter to the proposal was Atan Burhagohain, who displayed his statesmanship.

Atan Burhagohain argued that there was no guarantee that the Emperor at Delhi will abide by Ram Singh's assurance. Also, a settlement then would mean that the drain on the country's resources would have been in vain. Further, what was the guarantee that once the Mughals take Guwahati, they would not reach for Garhgaon or even Namrup (Sarkar 1990:224)?

Atan Burhagohain was able to persuade the other commanders and the Ahoms rejected this proposal. The diplomatic efforts of Ram Singh failed once again.

Final battle at Saraighat 1671

The Battle of Saraighat, March 1671Meanwhile, Mughal reinforcements in the shape of war-vessels and imperial officers (Omraos) reached Ram Singh, along with the Mughal admiral, Munnawar Khan and the Mughal Viceroy Shaista Khan, sent the message that Ram Singh was sent to fight the Assamese, not make friends with them (Sarkar 1992:225). Ram Singh now made preparations for his final and direct assault on Guwahati and began moving along the northbank. Near Sualkuchi he was joined by ships with artillery and archers under five sardars. The Mughals had large boats, some carrying as many as sixteen cannons. The Mughal ambassador, Paditrai, had reported a breach in the embankment at Andharubali a few days earlier, and Ram Singh wanted to exploit this opening (Gogoi 1968:474–475).

The Ahom soldiers were demoralised after their losses at Allaboi. Their commander-in-chief, Lachit Borphukan and their admiral were both seriously ill, and the Nara Raja, the son of the Miri Sandikoi, was in command. An encounter both on land and water ensued near Ashwakranta. The Ahom land forces, under Laluk Borgohain Phukan, worsted the Mughals, but the Mughal boats compelled the Ahom boats to retreat to Barhila, north of Saraighat. The land forces, fearing an encirclement, too retreated (Sarkar 1992:226). The battle reached a crucial phase, when the Mughals were beginning to get close to Andharubali. The Borphukan, as well as the Nara Raja sent messages to inspire the soldiers. It looked as if there was a break in command and some boats began falling back to Kajali and Samdhara. Lachit Barphukan was observing this from his sickbed in the gatehouse of the Itakhuli fort.

At this crucial moment in the battle, when the Mughals were about to land at Andharubali, the Borphukan sent orders via katakis to all the land and naval forces to attack. He also ordered seven war-boats[4] for himself and had Nadai of Kharangi carry him to a boat. He shouted "The King has put all the people in my hands to fight the Bongal. Shall I go back to my wife and children?" and pushed a few men into the water. With the other six war-boats the Borphukan headed toward the naval battle (Sarkar 1992:226).

The entry of the Borphukan transformed the Ahom soldiers. His small flotilla soon swelled with Ahom warships from all sides that smashed into the Mughal warships at Amrajuli on the north bank, opposite Kamakhya hills. The triangle in the river, between Itakhuli, Kamakhya and Aswakranta was filled with men and boat. The Ahoms spanned the river over an improviso bridge of boats and resorted to a combined front and rear attack. The Mughal admiral Munnawar Khan, smoking a hookah was killed by a gunshot from the back, throwing the Mughals out of gear. They suffered the loss of three top-ranking amirs, and another 4000 dead. The day of this decisive battle is not known for certain, only that it happened in the middle of March 1671.

Epilogue

The Mughals were pursued to the Manas river, the Ahom kingdom's western boundary. The Borphukan instructed his men not to attack the retreating army, reminding them of Alaboi (Gogoi 1968:476). Anticipating a counter attack, he set messengers at regular intervals, while Atan Burhagohain and other commanders stood ready for one. The Mughals in Darrang were also worsted, and Ram Singh left Kamrup on April 7, 1671 for Rangamati (Gogoi 1968:476). Ram Singh waited in vain for another opportunity, and finally had an audience with Aurangzeb on June 25, 1676.

Lachit Borphukan died at Kaliabor about a year later in April 1672, but not from the illness at Saraighat (Gogoi 1968:479). And this was not the final battle between the Ahoms and the Mughals, nor did Guwahati remain with the Ahoms. Lachit Borphukan's own brother and successor Borphukan, Laluk Sola, deserted Guwahati for the Mughals in 1679. It remained with the Mughals till 1682, when the Ahoms under Gadadhar Singha recovered it and ended Mughal control in Kamrup for ever, though the Mughal administration of 80 years cast a long shadow.

The Battle of Saraighat was the last battle in the last major attempt by the Mughals to extend their empire in to Assam. Though the Mughals managed to regain Guwahati briefly after a later Borphukan deserted it, the Ahoms wrested control in 1682 and maintained it till the end of their rule.

Notes

^ A graphic description of the preparation is available in Purani Asam Buranji.

^ Sur-bosa, special forces that operated behind enemy lines, led by Bagh Hazarika, a Muslim, entered the Itakhuli fort and rendered the cannons and gunpowder inoperative by pouring water on them.

^ According to tradition, Lachit himself executed his uncle for dereliction of duty while the embankment was being constructed at Amingaon at North Guwahati. Though this incident finds no mention in any historical document, tradition accords Lachit the quote "My uncle is not greater than my country". Nevertheless, it is recorded that the Borphukan passed an order that the punishment for dereliction of duty was decapitation. This caused a slight furore since only the king was allowed to execute a subject by shedding blood, and in a meeting at the capital, this was discussed. The chief queen, citing the war, intervened on Borphukan's behalf and the order was allowed to stand and the fortifications were completed.

^ Ahom war-boats were called bacharis, which were similar to the war boats in Bengal, called kosa or ranatari, except that the bachari had one leveled plank to the kosa's two projecting horns (Kakoty 2003:109).

References

Barua, Ajit, Lachit Borphukan, http://web.archive.org/web/20070310224244/http://www.assam.org/mod.php?mod=userpage&menu=90409&page_id=178

retrieved 2009-04-14

Bhuyan, Surya Kumar (1971), Lachit Borphukan (in Assamese), Assam Publication Board, Guwahati

Gogoi, Padmeshwar (1968), The Tai and the Tai kingdoms, Guwahati: Gauhati University

Kakoty, Sanjeeb (2003), Technology, production and Social Formation in the evolution of the Ahom State, Regency Publications, New Delhi

Sarkar, J. N. (1992), "Chapter VIII Assam-Mughal Relations", in Barpujari, H. K., The Comprehensive History of Assam, 2, Guwahati: Assam Publication Board, pp. 148–256

Sinha, Lt Gen S K, Emulate the spirit and skill of Lachit Borphukan, http://www.hvk.org/articles/0801/92.html

HOME